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Abstract: This paper investigates the synthesis of successful sensor deception attack functions
in supervisory control using abstraction methods to reduce computational complexity. In sensor
deception attacks, an attacker hijacks a subset of the sensors of the plant and feeds incorrect
information to the supervisor with the intent on causing damage to the supervised system. The
attacker is successful if its attack causes damage to the system and it is not identified by an
intrusion detection module. The existence test and the synthesis method of successful sensor
deception attack functions are computationally expensive, specifically in partially observed
systems. For this reason, we leverage results on abstraction methods to reduce the computational
effort in solving these problems. Namely, we introduce an equivalence relation called restricted
observation equivalence, that is used to abstract the original system before calculating attack
functions. Based on this equivalence relation we prove that the existence of successful attack
functions in the abstracted supervised system guarantees the existence of successful attack
functions in the unabstracted supervised system and vice versa. Moreover, successful attack
functions synthesized from the abstracted system can be exactly mapped to successful attack
functions on the unabstracted system, thereby providing a complete solution to the attack
synthesis problem.
Keywords: Automaton, Deception Attacks, Abstraction, Supervisory Control Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, human dependability on cyber-
physical systems has rapidly increased. Usually, these
systems are highly complex, and appear in settings that
are safety critical, where small failures may result in
huge financial and/or human losses. These failures may
be caused by external attacks that manipulate the sensor
measurements received by the controller or the supervisor.
This class of attacks is called sensor deception attacks.
Prior work on sensor deception attacks in the field of Dis-
crete Event Systems (DES) focuses on characterizing suc-
cessful attack strategies for fixed supervisors (Meira-Góes
et al., 2017; Su, 2018; Meira-Góes et al., 2019a; Meira-Góes
et al., 2019c), on designing intrusion detection modules for
fixed supervisors (Thorsley and Teneketzis, 2006; Carvalho
et al., 2018; Lima et al., 2019), or on designing robust
supervisors against sensor deception attacks (Wakaiki et
al., 2018; Su, 2018; Meira-Góes et al., 2019d; Meira-Góes
et al., 2019b); see (Rashidinejad et al., 2019) for a review in
this area. These works mostly focus on the effect of the at-
tacker on the supervisory control framework. Formally, the
1 The work of the first author was supported by the Swedish
Research Council (VR 2016-00529). The work of the second and third
authors was supported in part by US NSF grants CNS-1738103 and
CNS-1801342.
attacker is modelled by an attack function that edits the
behavior generated by the system and feeds this edited be-
havior to the supervisor. However, these recent results do
not provide computationally efficient methods, especially
in the case of partially observed systems. For more infor-
mation on the supervisory control framework under sensor
deception attacks see (Meira-Góes et al., 2017; Meira-Góes
et al., 2019a).
This work focuses on synthesizing successful sensor decep-
tion attack strategies for fixed supervisors in an efficient
manner. The work of (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) provides a
methodology to solve this problem based on a game-graph
structure called the All Insertion-Deletion Attack (AIDA)
structure. The AIDA structure captures the interaction
between the supervisor and the environment (which in-
cludes the system and the attacker). Based on the AIDA,
a successful attack strategy, if one exists, can be obtained.
The construction of the AIDA is based on the dis-
crete model of the system and the supervisor that con-
tains admissible control decisions and differentiates nor-
mal/abnormal behavior. Usually the discrete model of
a cyber-physical system is complex and as a result the
computation of the AIDA could be potentially costly. To
mitigate this issue, in this paper an abstraction method
is investigated to reduce the size of the system before
calculating the AIDA. The proposed abstraction method
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is based on observation equivalence, which is a well-known
abstraction method (Milner, 1989). Observation equiva-
lence considers states as equivalent if they have the same
future behavior. Observation equivalence however, can
not be used to abstract a system before calculating the
AIDA and some adjustments are necessary. Abstraction-
based observation equivalence was used in (Zhang and Za-
mani, 2017; Mohajerani and Lafortune, 2019; Mohajerani
et al., 2019) in opacity setting.
This paper introduces a restricted version of observation
equivalence, which is used to abstract the system before
calculating the AIDA. Since the abstraction method re-
duces the size of the system by merging some states the
computational complexity of the AIDA can be reduced.
Moreover, the abstraction method can be calculated in
polynomial time and it guarantees that successful attack
functions synthesized from the abstracted system can be
exactly mapped to successful attack functions on the orig-
inal system.
The presentation of our results is organized as follows.
Sect. 2 gives a brief background on modeling and the All
Insertion-Deletion Attack structure. Next, Sect. 3 explains
the abstraction method that is used in this paper and
shows how it is leveraged for synthesizing successful attack
functions. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in
Sect. 4.
2. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
2.1 Supervisory Control System Model
Discrete system behaviors can be modeled by deterministic
or nondeterministic automata.
Definition 1. A (nondeterministic) finite-state automaton
is a tuple G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦�, where Σ is a finite set of
events, Q is a finite set of states, → ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is the
state transition relation, and x◦ ⊆ Q is the initial state.
G is deterministic, if x
σ
→ y1 and x
σ
→ y2 always implies
y1 = y2.
Σ∗ is the set of all finite traces of events from Σ, including
the empty trace ǫ.
The transition relation is written in infix notation x
σ
→ y,
and is extended to strings in Σ∗ by letting x
ǫ
→ x for all
x ∈ Q, and x
tσ
→ z if x
t
→ y and y
σ
→ z for some y ∈ Q.
Furthermore, x
t
→ means that x
t
→ y for some y ∈ Q, and
x → y means that x
t
→ y for some t ∈ Σ∗. These notations
also apply to state sets, X
t
→ Y for X,Y ⊆ Q means that
x
t






The language of an automaton G is L(G) = { s ∈ Σ∗ |
G
s
→}. In addition, for q ∈ Q let ΓG(q) = {e ∈ Σ|q
e
→}
be the set of active events at state q. By a slight abuse of
notation, we write ΓG(S) = ∪q∈SΓG(q) for S ⊆ Q.
One common automaton operation is the quotient modulo
an equivalence relation on the state set.
Definition 2. Let Z be a set. A relation ∼ ⊆ Z×Z is called
an equivalence relation on Z if it is reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive. Given an equivalence relation ∼ on Z, the
equivalence class of z ∈ Z is [z] = { z′ ∈ Z | z ∼ z′ },
and Z̃ = { [z] | z ∈ Z } is the set of all equivalence classes
modulo ∼.
Definition 3. Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� be an automaton and
let ∼ ⊆ Q × Q be an equivalence relation. The quotient
automaton of G modulo ∼ is
G̃ = �Σ, Q̃,→/∼, x̃◦� , (1)
where →/∼ = { ([x], σ, [y]) | x
σ
→ y } and x̃◦ = [x◦].
In supervisory control theory, an automaton G, called
the plant, models the uncontrolled behavior of a system.
This automaton is controlled by a supervisor SP that
dynamically enables and disables the controllable events
such that it enforces some safety property on G. The
limited actuation capabilities of G are modeled by a
partition of the event set Σ = Σc ∪ Σuc, where Σuc
is the set of uncontrollable events and Σc is the set
of controllable events. In the notation of the theory of
supervisory control of DES initiated in (Ramadge and
Wonham, 1987), the resulting controlled behavior is a new
DES denoted by SP /G and resulting in the closed-loop
language L(SP /G), which is defined in the usual manner
(Cassandras and Lafortune, 2008). The set of admissible
control decisions is defined as Γ = {γ ⊆ Σ | Σuc ⊆ γ},
where admissibility guarantees that a control decision
never disables uncontrollable events.
In addition, due to the limited sensing capabilities of G,
the event set is also partitioned into Σ = Σo ∪Σuo, where
Σo is the set of observable events and Σuo is the set of
unobservable events. Based on this second partition, the
projection function P : Σ∗ → Σ∗o is defined as P (ǫ) = ǫ,
and for s ∈ Σ∗, e ∈ Σ then P (se) = P (s)e if e ∈ Σo




Σ∗ is defined as P−1o (t) = {s ∈ Σ
∗|P (s) = t}.
For brevity, p
s
⇒ q, with s ∈ Σ∗o, denotes the existence of
a string t ∈ Σ∗ such that P (t) = s and p
t
→ q. Similarly,
p ⇒ q means there exists t ∈ Σ∗uo such that p
t
→ q.
Formally, a partial observation supervisor is a func-
tion SP : P (L(G)) → Γ. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that SP is realized (i.e., encoded) as
a deterministic automaton R = (QR,Σ,→R, q0), see
(Cassandras and Lafortune, 2008). Based on supervisor
R, we construct a supervisor Rdead that is equivalent to R
but captures P (L(R/G)) and also detects the language
P (L(G)) \ P (L(R/G)). Formally, Rdead = (QRdead =
QR ∪ {dead},Σ,→d, q0) is a copy of R augmented with a
deadlock state called dead that is only reached via strings
in P (L(G)) \ P (L(R/G)).
The supervisor Rdead allows us to merge an intrusion
detection mechanism with supervisor R, where strings that
reach the dead state are detectable.
For convenience, we define two operators that are used
in this paper together with some useful notation. The
unobservable reach of the subset of states S ⊆ Q under
the subset of events γ ⊆ Σ is given by:





The observable reach (or next states) of the subset of states
S ⊆ Q given the execution of the observable event e ∈ Σo
is defined as:
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For any string s ∈ Σ∗, let si denote the prefix of s with
the first i events, and let eis be the i
th event of s, so that
si = e1s . . . e
i
s; by convention, s
0 = ǫ. We define s̄ as the
set of prefixes of string s ∈ Σ∗. Lastly, we denote by N,
N
+, and Nn = {0, . . . , n} the sets of natural numbers,
positive natural numbers, and natural numbers bounded
by n, respectively.
2.2 The Insertion-Deletion Attack Structure
The problem introduced in (Meira-Góes et al., 2017;
Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) is to synthesize an attack func-
tion such that a critical state is reachable and the state
dead is unreachable in the attacked controlled behavior.
In (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a), the framework of supervi-
sory control under sensor deception attacks is introduced,
where an attacker is modelled by an attack function. We
assume that Q contains a set of critical states defined as
Qcrit ⊂ Q, which are never reached when SP controls G
and no attacker is present. The problem of synthesizing
“successful” attack functions is posed, where successful
means an attacker that causes the system to reach Qcrit
without being detected. A two-player structure called the
All-Insertion-Deletion Attack structure (AIDA) is intro-
duced in (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) as a general solu-
tion methodology to synthesize stealthy deception attacks
against a fixed supervisor Rdead. The AIDA captures the
interaction between the supervisor and the environment
that is defined by the plant executions and attacker ac-
tions.
Namely, the AIDA enumerates all deception attack actions
and all possible plant executions based on the control
decisions of the supervisor. Thus, we define the pair
IS ∈ 2Q × QRdead to be the information state, and
I = 2Q × QRdead the set of all information states. As
defined, an IS embeds the necessary information for either
the supervisor or the environment to make a decision.
In order to construct the AIDA the set of compromised
events Σa ⊆ Σo needs to be introduced. This event set
specifies the events that the attacker can edit. To identify
the attacker actions, let Σi = {ei|e ∈ Σa} and Σ
d =
{ed|e ∈ Σa} be the sets of inserted and deleted events,
respectively. These events sets clearly identify the attacker
actions at the communication channel between the plant
G and the supervisor Rdead. Note that the subscripts are
introduced for convenience and the supervisor receives the
actual event execution in G. Let Σm = Σ∪Σ
i ∪Σd be the
complete event set.
We define M(ei) = M(ed) = M(e) = e for e ∈ Σ,
PG(e) = M(e) for e ∈ Σ ∪ Σd and PG(e) = ǫ for e ∈ Σi,
and PS(e) = M(e) for e ∈ Σ ∪ Σi and PS(e) = ǫ for
e ∈ Σd. The mask M removes subscripts, when present,
from events in Σm, the projection P
G projects an event in
Σm to its actual event execution in G, and the projection
PS projects an event in Σm to its event observation by
Rdead.
For simplicity, in Def. 4 µd is considered as the transition
function ofRdead, where µd(q, e) = p is the same as q
e
→d p.
Definition 4. (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) An All-Insertion-
Deletion Attack structure (AIDA) A w.r.t. G, Σa, and
Rdead, is defined as
A = (QS , QE , hSE , hES ,Σm, y0) (4)
where:
• QS ⊆ I is the set of S-states, where S stands for
Supervisor and where each S-state is of the form
y = (IG(y), IS(y)), where IG(y) and IS(y) denote
the state estimate of the plant and the state of the
supervisor, respectively;
• QE ⊆ I is the set of E-states, where E stands for
Environment; each E-state is defined in the same way
as in the S-states case;
• hSE : QS ×Γ → QE is the partial transition function
from S-states to E-states, defined for y ∈ QS and
γ = ΓRdead(IS(y)) as:
hSE(y, γ) := (URγ(IG(y)), IS(y)) (5)
• hES : QE × (Σo ∪ Σ
i ∪ Σd) → QS is the partial
transition function from E-states to S-states. It is
defined as follows: for any y ∈ QS , (zG, zS) ∈ QE and
e ∈ Σo ∪ Σ
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• y0 := ({x
◦}, q0) ∈ QS is the initial state.
An S-state is an IS where the supervisor issues its control
decision and an E-state is an IS at which the environment
(system or attacker) selects one among the observable
events to occur. A transition from an S-state to an E-state
represents the updated unobservable reach in G’s state
estimate together with the current supervisor state. On
the other hand, a transition from an E-state to an S-state
represents the “observable reach” immediately following
the execution of the observable event by the environment.
In this case, both the system’s state estimate and the
supervisor’s state are updated. However, these updates
depend on the type of event generated by the environment:
(i) true system event unaltered by the attacker; (ii) (ficti-
tious) event insertion by the attacker; or (iii) deletion by
the attacker of an event just executed by the system. Thus,
the transition rules are split into three cases as defined by
Equation (6).
Definition 4 also defines a construction algorithm of the
AIDA, where starting from the initial state y0 a breadth
first search is performed to compute all states and transi-
tions in the AIDA. Since the goal of the attacker is to reach
any state in Qcrit, no transitions are defined in E-states
z ∈ QE that satisfy IG(z) ⊆ Qcrit.
After calculating the AIDA of a system a pruning pro-
cess that removes non-stealthy attacks from the AIDA
is applied. This pruning process can be mapped to a
supervisory control problem, as explained in (Meira-Góes
et al., 2019a). Specifically, any event e ∈ Σa ∪ Σ
i ∪ Σd
is considered controllable and any event e ∈ Σo \ Σa is
uncontrollable. The plant is AIDA A and the specification
Atrim is obtained by removing all states of the AIDA where
the supervisor Rdead reaches a dead state, y = (S, dead).
The pruning process in (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) is a
fixed-point algorithm that removes states from Atrim iter-
atively until convergence. The pruned AIDA, where only
3












Fig. 1. The steps of calculating the abstracted ISDA of
system G.
stealthy attack functions are present, is denoted as the
Interruptible Stealthy Deceptive Attack (ISDA) structure.
3. ABSTRACTED INSERTION-DELETION ATTACK
STRUCTURE
The objective of this paper is to calculate an abstracted
ISDA with less states and the same interruptible and
stealthy attacks as the original ISDA. In this section the
proposed algorithm to calculate the abstracted ISDA is
described. Fig. 1 gives an overview of the methodology
to construct the abstraction-based ISDA. The input to
the algorithm is a nondeterministic automaton G and its
supervisor Rdead. In the proposed algorithm the nonde-
terministic system G is first abstracted using a restricted
version of observation equivalence before the AIDA is
calculated. This leads to an AIDA with less states com-
pared to the original AIDA. Finally, using the abstracted
AIDA, we show that the abstracted ISDA contains the
same interruptible and stealthy attack strategies as the
original ISDA.
In the following, first, the restricted version of observa-
tion equivalence is defined. Next, it is shown that the
abstracted AIDA and the original AIDA contain the same
attack strategies.
3.1 Observation Equivalence
This section presents an abstraction method that can be
used to abstract a nondeterministc automaton before cal-
culating the AIDA of the system. The abstraction method
is based on observation equivalence, which is computation-
ally efficient and can be calculated in polynomial-time.
Observation equivalence or weak bisimulation is a widely-
used notion of abstraction that merges states with the
same future behavior when unobservable events are dis-
regarded.
Definition 5. (Milner, 1989) Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦�, be
a nondeterministic automaton. An equivalence relation
≈ ⊆ Q × Q is called an observation equivalence on G,
if the following holds for all x1, x2 ∈ Q such that x1 ≈ x2:
if x1
s
⇒ y1 for some s ∈ Σ
∗, then there exists y2 ∈ Q such
that x2
s





































































Fig. 2. Automata of Example 1.
In order to be able to use observation equivalence in the
attack framework of this paper, we need to consider the
critical states.
Definition 6. LetG = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� be a non-deterministic
automaton. An equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ Q × Q is called
restricted version of observation equivalence on G, if the
following holds for all x1, x2 ∈ Q such that x1 ∼ x2:
• if x1
σ
→ y1 and σ ∈ Σo then x2
σ
→ y2 and y1 ∼ y2
• if x1
σ
→ y1 and σ ∈ Σuo then x2
σ
⇒ y2 and y1 ∼ y2
• x1 ∈ Qcrit if and only if x2 ∈ Qcrit
In the restricted version of observation equivalence, similar
to observation equivalence, two states are equivalent if
they have the same future behavior. Moreover, the re-
stricted version of observation equivalence requires the
equivalent states to have the same critical status, i.e.,
either all are critical or none of them are critical states.
Example 1. Consider the system G with the set of crit-
ical states Qcrit = {q6}, Σuc = {β}, Σuo = {υ} and
the compromised event set Σa = {α} . Automaton G
and Rdead are shown in Fig. 1. The figure also shows
the original AIDA of the system, A. In the figure the
initial states are marked by an arrow pointing into them,
the S-states of A are shaded grey and the critical states
of G and the dead-state of the supervisor Rdead are
crossed out. The initial state of A is (q0, 0). The active
event of Rdead at state 0 is ΓRdead(0) = {υ, β, α} and
UR{υ,β,α} = {q0, q1, q2, q3}. Thus, event {υ, β, α} is ex-
ecutable at the initial state of A leading the AIDA to the
E-state (q0q1q2q3, 0). Now consider event β, which is an












= (q4, 1) is an S-
state of AIDA A and it is reached from state (q0q1q2q3, 0)
by executing β. The whole structure is interpreted in
a similar way. To obtain the ISDA, we must eliminate
the non-stealthy strategies. Applying the pruning process
previously described in Sect. 2, we obtain the ISDA At
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depicted in Fig. 2. State q6 is reachable in At, which implies
that there exists a successful stealthy attack function.
In the framework considered in this paper, the system
automaton G is abstracted by applying the restricted
version of observation equivalence before the construction
of the AIDA. States q0, q1 and q2 are equivalent as qi ⇒
q3 for i = 0, 1, 2. Moreover, states q4 and q5 are also
equivalent as q4
α
→ q6 and q5
α
→ q6. Merging equivalent
states results in automaton G̃ shown in Fig. 1. In the figure
the critical states of G̃ are crossed out.
3.2 AIDA with Abstracted Model
In the previous section, we have introduced the restricted
version of observation equivalence as a mean to abstract
a system before calculating the AIDA of the system. In
this section, we prove that the abstracted AIDA and the
original AIDA contain the same attack strategies if the
restricted version of observation equivalence is used to
abstract the system.
In the following, Proposition 3 establishes that the ab-
stracted AIDA and the original AIDA contain the same at-
tack strategies. Using the results from Proposition 3, Theo-
rem 4 proves that the abstracted ISDA embeds all possible
interruptible stealthy insertion-deletion attack strategies.
First Lemmas 1 and 2 provide auxiliary results to prove
Proposition 3.
Lemma 1. Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� and let ∼ be the re-
stricted version of observation equivalence. Let G̃ be the
quotient automaton of G by applying ∼. Consider S ⊆ Q
and S̃ ⊆ Q̃ such that x ∈ S if and only if [x] ∈ S̃, where
x ∈ [x]. Then y ∈ URγ(S) if and only if [y] ∈ URγ(S̃),
where y ∈ [y].
Proof. (⇒) Assume that y ∈ URγ(S). Based on (2), it
holds that there exists t ∈ (Σuo ∩ γ)
∗ such that x
t
→ y.




→ [y] and y ∈ [y].
(⇐) A similar argument as above holds.
✷
Lemma 1 proves that the unobservable reach of the two
subsets S and S̃, where the states of S̃ are restricted
observation equivalent to the states of S, are also restricted
observation equivalent.
Lemma 2. Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� and let ∼ be the re-
stricted version of observation equivalence on G. Consider
S ⊆ Q and S̃ ⊆ Q̃ such that x ∈ S if and only if
[x] ∈ S̃, where x ∈ [x]. Then y ∈ NXe(S) if and only
if [y] ∈ NXe(S̃), where y ∈ [y].
Proof. (⇒) Assume that y ∈ NXe(S). Then based on (3)
it holds that there exists x
e
→ y. Based on Def. 6 it holds
that [x]
e
→ [y] and y ∈ [y].
(⇐) A similar argument as above holds.
✷
Similarly to Lemma 1, Lemma 2 proves that the observable
reach of the two subsets that contain restricted observation
equivalent states are also restricted observation equivalent.
Proposition 3. Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� and let ∼ be the
restricted version of observation equivalence on G. Let A
be the AIDA with respect to G, Σa and Rdead and Ã be
the AIDA with respect to G̃, Σa and Rdead. Then A
ω
→ p
if and only if Ã
ω
→ p̃ such that:
(i) p is an S-state, E-state, if and only if p̃ is an S-state,
E-State,
(ii) IG(p) ⊆ Qcrit if and only if IG̃(p̃) ⊆ Q̃crit,
(iii) IS(p) = dead if and only IS(p̃) = dead.
Proof. We show that a transition is defined in A if and
only if the same transition is defined in Ã. It is shown
by induction on n ≥ 0 that y0
ω
→ pn in A if and only if
ỹ0
ω
→ p̃n in Ã. Note that pn or p̃n consist of S-states and
E-states. Since there is no reduction on Rdead it holds that
IS(pn) = IS(p̃n).
Base case: (⇒) Let x̃◦ be the initial state of G̃ and q◦
be the initial state of Rdead. Then the initial state of A is
y0 = ({x
◦}, q◦) and the initial state of Ã is ỹ0 = ({x̃
◦}, q◦)
and they both are S-states. First assume that y0
γ0
→ z0
in A, which is an hSE transition. We need to show that
there exists ỹ0
γ0
→ z̃0 in Ã. Based on Def. 4 it holds that
IG(z0) = URγ0({x
◦}), IS(z0) = IS(y0) = q
◦ and γ0 =
ΓRdead(IS(y0)) = ΓRdead(q
◦). Since x◦ ∈ x̃◦ it means that
v ∈ IG(y0) if and only if there exists [v] ∈ IG̃(ỹ0). Based
on Lemma 1 it holds that u ∈ URγ0({x
◦}) if and only
if there exists [u] ∈ URγ0({x̃
◦}). This means that there
exists IG̃(z̃0) = URγ0({x̃
◦}), where for every u ∈ IG(z0)
there exists a [u] ∈ IG̃(z̃0). Since u ∈ [u] it follows from
Def. 6 that [u] ∈ Q̃crit if u ∈ Qcrit, which implies that
IG̃(z̃0) ⊆ Q̃crit if IG(z0) ⊆ Qcrit. Thus, ỹ0
γ0
→ z̃0 in Ã,
where IG̃(z̃0) = URγ0({x̃
◦}), IS(z̃0) = IS(ỹ0) = q
◦ and
γ0 = ΓRdead(IS(ỹ0)) = ΓRdead(q
◦).
(⇐) Now assume that ỹ0
γ0
→ z̃0 in Ã. A similar argument
as above holds.
Inductive step: Assume that the claim holds for some
n ≥ 0, i.e, y0
ω
→ pn in A if and only if ỹ
0 ω→ p̃n in Ã,
pn is an S-state, E-state, if and only if p̃n is an S-state,
E-state and IG(pn) ⊆ Qcrit if and only if IG̃(p̃n) ⊆ Q̃crit,
IS(pn) = dead if and only IS(p̃n) = dead and v ∈ IG(pn)
if and only if there exists [v] ∈ IG̃(p̃n).
(⇒) Now it must be shown that if pn
γn
→ pn+1 in A then
p̃n
γn
→ p̃n+1 in Ã such that IG(pn+1) ⊆ Qcrit if and only
if IG̃(p̃n+1) ⊆ Q̃crit and IS(pn+1) = dead if and only
IS(p̃n+1) = dead. Note that since based on the inductive
assumption pn is an S-state, E-state, if and only if p̃n is
an S-state, E-state, it is clear that pn+1 is an S-state,
E-state, if and only if p̃n+1 is an S-state, E-state.
Consider the following two possibilities:
• pn ∈ QS , which implies that pn
γn
→ pn+1 is an
hSE transition. Then based on Def. 4 it holds that
IG(pn+1) = URγn(IG(pn)), IS(pn+1) = IS(pn) and
γn = ΓRdead(IS(pn)). Since based on inductive as-
sumption it holds that v ∈ IG(pn) if and only if
there exists [v] ∈ IG̃(p̃n) it follows from Lemma 1
that u ∈ URγn(IG(pn)) if and only if there ex-
ists [u] ∈ URγn(IG̃(p̃n)). This means there exists
IG̃(p̃n+1) = URγn(IG̃(p̃n)), where for every u ∈
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IG(pn+1) there exists an [u] ∈ IG̃(p̃n+1). Since u ∈
[u] it holds that IG(pn+1) ⊆ Qcrit if and only if
IG̃(p̃n+1) ⊆ Q̃crit. Thus, p̃n
γn
→ p̃n+1 is in Ã, where
IG̃(p̃n+1) = URγn(IG̃(p̃n)), IS(p̃n+1) = IS(p̃n) and
γn = ΓRdead(IS(p̃n)).
• pn ∈ QE , which implies that pn
γn
→ pn+1 is an hES .
Then γn = e and there are three cases:
· e ∈ Σo ∩ ΓRdead(IS(pn)) ∩ ΓG(IG(pn)). Based
on Def. 4 it holds that pn+1 = (NXe(IG(pn))
, µd(IS(pn), e)). Since based on inductive assump-
tion it holds that v ∈ IG(pn) if and only if there
exists [v] ∈ IG̃(p̃n) it follows from Lemma 2
that there exists NXe(IG̃(p̃n)) such that u ∈
NXe(IG(pn)) if and only if [u] ∈ NXe(IG̃(p̃n)).
Then, based on Def. 6 it holds that IG(pn+1) ⊆
Qcrit if and only if IG̃(p̃n+1) ⊆ Q̃crit. Thus,
p̃n
e
→ p̃n+1 in Ã, where p̃n+1 = (NXe(IG̃ (p̃n)),
µd(IS(p̃n), e)).
· e ∈ Σi and Me(e) ∈ Σa ∩ ΓRdead(IG(pn)). Based
on Def. 4 it holds that pn+1 = (IG(pn), µd(IS
(pn), P
S(e))), and p̃n+1 = (IG̃(p̃n), µd(IS(p̃n),
PS(e))).
· e ∈ Σd and Me(e) ∈ Σa ∩ ΓRdead(IG(z)) ∩
ΓG(IG(z)). Note that P
G(e) = P G̃(e). Based
on Def. 4 it holds that pn+1 = (NXPG(e)(
IG(pn)), IS(pn)). Since based on inductive as-
sumption it holds that v ∈ IG(pn) if and only
if there exists [v] ∈ IG̃(p̃n) it follows from
Lemma 2 that there exists NXPG(e)(IG̃(p̃n))
such that u ∈ NXPG(e)(IG (pn)) if and only if
[u] ∈ NXPG(e)(IG̃(p̃n)). Then based on Def. 6
it holds that IG(pn+1) ⊆ Qcrit if and only if
IG̃(p̃n+1) ⊆ Q̃crit. Thus, p̃n
e
→ p̃n+1 in Ã, where
p̃n+1 = (NXPG(e) (IG(p̃n)), IS(p̃n)).
(⇐) It must be shown that if p̃n
γn
→ p̃n+1 in Ã then
pn
γn
→ pn+1 in A. A similar argument as above holds. ✷
Proposition 3 proves that a system can be abstracted using
the restricted version of observation equivalence before
calculating the AIDA and the abstracted AIDA and the
original AIDA have the same structure.
Example 2. Consider the system G and its corresponding
AIDA A shown in Fig. 2. As it was shown in Example 1
automaton G can be abstracted using the restricted ver-
sion of observation equivalence. Using G̃ and Rdead the
abstracted AIDA Ã, shown in Fig. 3, can be calculated,
which has 2 states less than the original AIDA A. Auto-
mata G̃, Rdead and A are shown in Fig. 2.
After constructing the abstracted AIDA Ã, the non-
stealthy interruptible attack strategies must be removed
via the pruning process. The following theorem is the main
contribution of the paper and it proves that successful
attack functions synthesized from the abstracted system
can be exactly mapped to successful attack functions on
the original system. To establish this result, the theorem
proves that the original AIDA A and the abstracted AIDA
Ã are bisimilar and the pruning process removes from A
and Ã bisimilar states. Consequently, the abstracted ISDA




































Fig. 3. Automata of Examples 2 and 3. The initial states
are marked by an arrow pointing into them and the
S-states of Ã and Ãt are shaded grey.
Theorem 4. Let G = �Σ, Q,→, x◦� and let ∼ be the
restricted version of observation equivalence on G. Let
Ãt be the ISDA with respect to G̃, Σa and Rdead. Then
Ãt embeds all possible interruptible stealthy insertion-
deletion attack strategies.
Proof. To prove the theorem we show the following:
(i) the AIDA of the original system and the abstracted
system are bisimilar,
(ii) the specification of the original system and the ab-
stracted system are bisimilar,
(iii) the pruning process removes from A and Ã bisimilar
states.
(i): Let A be the AIDA based on Σa and Rdead and G and
Ã be the AIDA based on Σa, Rdead and G̃. It was shown
in Proposition 3 that A
ω
→ if and only Ã
ω
→, which implies
that A and Ã are bisimilar.
(ii): Let Atrim and Ãtrim be the specifications obtained
by removing states of A and Ã, where IS(p) = dead and
IS(p̃) = dead. Based on Proposition 3 it holds that the
A
ω
→ p if and only if Ã
ω
→ p̃ and IS(p) = dead if and only
IS(p̃) = dead, which implies that the specifications Atrim
and Ãtrim are bisimilar.
(iii): It has been proven in (Mohajerani et al., 2014)
that the synthesis procedure that removes uncontrollable
states from two deterministic bisimilar automata produces
bisimilar supervisors. This proves that the uncontrollable
states removed from A and Ã are bisimilar. The pruning
process in (Meira-Góes et al., 2019a) is a fixed-point
algorithm that also removes all the E-states q ∈ QAi
such that e ∈ ΓA(q) but both e and ed are absent from
ΓAi(q), where A
i is an intermediate result in the fixed-
point pruning process. Now we need to prove that bisimilar
E-states are removed from A and Ã. This is shown by
induction on the iteration steps.
Base case: i = 0.
(⇒) Assume that q ∈ QA0 . Based on Proposition 3 it holds
that if A → q then Ã → q̃, which implies that q̃ ∈ Q̃Ã0 .
(⇐) Assume that q̃ ∈ Q̃Ã0 . A similar argument as above
holds.
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Inductive steps: Assume that the claim holds at iteration
n, i.e, q ∈ QAn if and only if q̃ ∈ Q̃Ãn . Now we need to
show that the claim holds for iteration n + 1. First let
q ∈ QAn+1 , which implies that e ∈ ΓA(q) and e ∈ ΓAn(q)
or ed ∈ ΓAn(q). From Proposition 3 it holds that if
An+1 → q
e
→ then Ãn+1 → q̃
e
→, which implies that
e ∈ ΓÃ(q̃). A similar argument as above holds for Atrim and
Ãtrim, which means that e ∈ ΓÃtrim(q̃) or ed ∈ ΓÃtrim(q̃).
This proves that q̃ ∈ Q̃Ãn+1 if q ∈ QAn+1 . Now assume
q̃ ∈ Q̃Ã+1 . A similar argument as above holds.
This means that At
ω
→ p if and only if Ãt
ω
→ p̃, which
implies that Ãt embeds all possible interruptible stealthy
insertion-deletion attack strategies. ✷
Example 3. Continuing Example 2, the corresponding ab-
stracted AIDA Ã is shown in Fig. 3. To calculate the
abstracted ISDA, the pruning process explained in Sect. 2
needs be applied on Ã. First, state ([q4], dead) is re-
moved producing specification Ãtrim, which makes E-state
([q4], 1) and then S-state ([q0], 1) uncontrollable. This re-
sults in abstracted ISDA Ãt, shown in Fig. 3, with 2 less
states compared to the original At, shown in Fig. 2.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate abstraction-based attack
function synthesis when the attacker feeds incorrect in-
formation to the supervisor in order to damage the su-
pervised system. To synthesize successful stealthy sensor
deception attacks, the All-Insertion-Deletion Attack struc-
ture (AIDA) is constructed. Calculating the AIDA can
be computationally expensive, specifically in partially ob-
served systems. To mitigate the computational complexity
of constructing the AIDA an abstraction method called
restricted version of observation equivalence is introduced
that can abstract the system by merging some states before
constructing the AIDA. We prove that the abstracted
AIDA provides a complete solution to the attack synthesis
problem. It would be of interest to investigate the abstrac-
tion methods not only for the system also for the super-
visor. Moreover, developing abstraction-based AIDA-like
structures for modular systems consisting of interacting
subsystems is also of interest.
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Stéphane Lafortune (2018). Detection and mitigation
of classes of attacks in supervisory control systems.
Automatica 97, 121– 133.
Cassandras, Christos G. and Stéphane Lafortune (2008).
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